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Last year, upon the thirtieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Goss v. Lopez, the then-general counsel of the National
School Boards Association decried the expansion of Goss from a “three
minute give and take” to the “paralysis” of public school discipline.1 For
example, she initially ascribed the following effect to the Goss Court:
“By making student discipline a constitutional issue, by elevating it to a
‘federal issue,’ the court has left educators fumbling away through their
* Youssef Chouhoud is a graduate student in political science at Lehigh University.
** Perry A. Zirkel, University Professor of Education and Law, Lehigh University.
1. Julie Underwood, Commentary, The 30th Anniversary of Goss v. Lopez, 198
EDUC. L. REP. 795, 797, 802 (2005).
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daily disciplinary dealings with students wondering and working at their
peril.”2 This Article empirically examines Goss and its lower court
progeny to determine whether they pose the major problem that is often
ascribed to them.
I. THE GOSS DECISION
On January 22, 1975, in the wake of its landmark dicta that “students . . .
[do not] shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”3 the
Supreme Court decided what has been described as “the most significant
United States Supreme Court case on student discipline.”4 In Goss v.
Lopez, the Court held that “[s]tudents facing temporary suspension have
interests qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause.”5 More
specifically, finding the requisite property interest in the state compulsory
education statute and, alternatively, the requisite liberty interest in the
potentially serious reputational damage,6 and balancing them against the
public schools’ interest in “discipline and order,”7 the majority held:
[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that
the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he
denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story.8

2. Id. at 803. In fairness, we observe that she was then serving as the national
advocate for school boards, which are the defendants in such suits; she ultimately
ascribed the expansion of Goss to state laws; and she admitted to lacking the research
data to support this purported causal relationship. Id.
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Although symbolically significant as a turning point for both students and teachers in
terms of the modern era of education litigation, this dictum was specific to their
“constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression.” Id. Nevertheless, the Goss
Court cited Tinker in terms of students’ constitutional rights more generally. Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). For a compilation of the Supreme Court’s educationrelated decisions, including the vote in each one, see PERRY A. ZIRKEL ET AL., A DIGEST
OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING EDUCATION (4th ed. 2001).
4. David M. Pedersen, A Homemade Switch Blade Knife and a Bent Fork:
Judicial Place Setting and Student Discipline, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053, 1066 (1998).
Attorney Pedersen is the former chairman of the National School Boards Association
Council of School Attorneys. Id. at 1053 n.†.
5. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized its
tradition of deference to public school authorities. Id. at 578.
6. Id. at 574. Although the Supreme Court has more recently elevated the
standard for the requisite deprivation of liberty, Goss reasoned that the charges of
misconduct, “[i]f sustained and recorded, . . . could seriously damage the students’
standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later
opportunities for higher education and employment.” Id. at 575.
7. Id. at 580. For the third, or intersecting, factor in the equation, the Court
reasoned: “The risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if that
may be done without prohibitive cost or interference with the educational process.” Id.
8. Id. at 581.

354

ZIRKEL.DOC

[VOL. 45: 353, 2008]

9/4/2008 11:02:49 AM

The Goss Progeny:An Empirical Analysis
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Based on this same two-step analysis of procedural due process (PDP)
under the Fourteenth Amendment,9 the Court added various significant
clarifications,10 including that “[l]onger suspensions or expulsions for
the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more
formal procedures.”11
The dissent, led by former school board member Lewis Powell,12
characterized the holding as an “unprecedented” and “unnecessary” judicial
intrusion13 that, expressly echoing Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker,14
signaled a flood of litigation15 and judicial oversight.16

9. The Court followed the conventional two-step analysis. Id. at 572–80; see,
e.g., Note, Due Process, Due Politics, and Due Respect: Three Models of Legitimate
School Governance, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1106, 1106 (1981) (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 10–12, at 532–33 (1978)). The two steps are
whether process is due and, if so, how much process is due. Goss, 419 U.S. at 577. The
first is based on the nature of the interest beyond a de minimis level, and the second is
based on the weight of the interest, including the risk of error, balanced against the
institutional, or governmental, interest. Id. at 572–80.
10. One clarification: The Court excluded from this “countrywide” constitutional
minimum “the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses
supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident.”
Goss, 419 U.S. at 583. In referring to this countrywide minimum, the Court appeared to
imply what is otherwise generally understood—that states and local school districts may
adopt policies that exceed the Court’s foundational requirements.
11. Id. at 584.
12. Prior to his tenure on the Court, Powell served as chair of the school board in
Richmond, Virginia, followed by a stint on Virginia’s State Board of Education. See J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent,
1975 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 46 (1975) (citing A.E. Dick Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the
Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MICH. L. REV. 445, 458–59 (1972)).
13. Goss, 419 U.S. at 585, 595 (Powell, J., dissenting). Failing to see the principled
limit in the majority opinion for de minimis denials of liberty or property, Powell issued
this forewarning with regard to various typical school actions, such as grading, promotion,
transfers, and exclusion from extracurricular activities: “If, as seems apparent, the Court
will now require due process procedures whenever such routine school decisions are
challenged, the impact upon public education will be serious indeed.” Id. at 599.
14. Id. at 600 n.22 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)).
15. Id.; see also id. at 585 (“[O]pens avenues for judicial intervention in the
operation of our public schools.”); id. at 597 (depicting the Court as entering a “new
‘thicket’”); id. at 599 (“[T]he federal courts should prepare themselves for a vast new
role in society.”).
16. Id. at 585; id. at 599; see also id. at 594 (noting the decision’s “indiscriminate
reliance upon the judiciary . . . as the means of resolving many of the most routine problems
arising in the classroom.”); id. at 597 (expressing concern about “constitutionalization of
the student-teacher relationship”).
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II. POPULAR AFTERMATH
In the immediate wake of Goss17 and periodically thereafter,18 various
commentators characterized Goss and its lower court progeny as disabling
school discipline. The mass media,19 special interest groups,20 and even
professional publications have reinforced this conception.21
17. See ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH ET AL., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, ORDER AND
AUTONOMY 114 (1984) (citing negative predictions in education publications); Henry
Lufler, Jr., The School Law Litigation Explosion: A Specious Generalization 1–2 (Nov.
1988) (unpublished paper presented at the annual conference of the National Organization on
Legal Problems of Education, on file with the author) (citing negative predictions in
education and legal publications). The negative scholarly commentary was rather
restrained, with authors conditioning their predictions on the response of school officials.
See, e.g., David L. Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School
Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 863–64 (1976); Leon Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez:
Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 627, 662 (1977); Wilkinson,
supra note 12, at 60, 66; cf. Burton B. Goldstein, Jr., Note, Due Process in the Public
Schools, 54 N.C. L. REV. 641, 674–75 (1976) (conditioning negative commentary on
extent of expansion to other school decisions, suggesting that it serves as an invitation to
more informal, customized procedures); Mark G. Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution,
Distrust of Authority, and Organizational Theory: Implementing Due Process for Students in
the Public Schools, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 891, 917–18 (predicting the possibility of procedural
regularity eclipsing substantive fairness).
18. For scholarly criticism of the Goss decision during the mid-1980s, see, for
example, David Schimmel & Richard Williams, Does Due Process Interfere with School
Discipline?, 68 HIGH SCH. J. 47, 48 (1985) (citing statement that decisions like Goss
“‘deprive school administrators of the tools they need to control school violence’”
(quoting Robert Pear, Reagan Expected to Present Plan to Fight Crime in Public
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1984, at A1)). For more recent similar attributions to Goss,
see Underwood, supra note 1, at 800–03; Richard Arum, For Their Own Good: Limit
Students’ Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at A17; George F. Will, Schools Beset by
Lawyers and Shrinks, WASH. POST, June 15, 2000, at A33.
19. The following observation about newspaper and magazine coverage is an
understatement, and is even more of an understatement for television coverage: “That the
plaintiffs in novel cases invariably were unsuccessful was less well publicized than that
the cases were filed in the first place.” Henry S. Lufler, Jr., Courts and School Discipline
Policies, in STUDENT DISCIPLINE STRATEGIES 197, 205 (Oliver C. Moles ed., 1990); see
also Larry Bartlett, Legal Responsibilities of Students: Study Shows School Officials Also
Win Court Decisions, 69 NASSP BULL. 39, 39 (1985). For modern examples of such
coverage, see Perry A. Zirkel, Judgment Day, 83 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 561, 561–62
(2002); Perry A. Zirkel, The Midol Case, 78 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 803, 803–04 (1997)
(discussing suspension or expulsion cases that attracted national media attention and that
included a PDP claim).
20. The current leading organization on this subject is Common Good. See, e.g.,
Public Agenda, “I’m Calling My Lawyer”: How Litigation, Due Process and Other
Regulatory Requirements Are Affecting Public Education 11 (2003), http://cgood.org/
learn-reading-cgpubs-polls-8.html. For a summary of the previous efforts of other such
interest groups, see, for example, Perry A. Zirkel, The Coverdell Teacher Protection Act:
Immunization or Illusion?, 179 EDUC. L. REP. 547, 547–51 (2003).
21. Lufler, supra note 17, at 10, attributed this reinforcing tendency to a slowness
in education law commentators’ recognition of changes in litigation patterns. Other
overlapping reasons may include: (1) a preventive law orientation that blurs the line with
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III. RELATED RESEARCH
A. Educators’ Knowledge and Attitudes
Survey studies since the late 1970s have generally found that educators
generally had low levels of knowledge of students’ Fourteenth Amendment
PDP rights under Goss.22 Due in part to misinformation and uncertainty,
educators tended to perceive that the Court had constrained educators’
discretion in the discipline of students.23
latitude for the sake of risk avoidance, (2) a mixing of normative notions of best education
practice with legal requirements, (3) the professional self-interest of magnifying the
importance of such matters, and (4) the focus on individual cases or issues, thus missing
the forest for the trees.
22. Nelda H. Cambron-McCabe & William P. Shula, Jr., Student Suspensions:
Goss Requirements Revisited, in EDUC. L. UPDATE 1987–1988 1, 6–8 (1988) (studying
elementary principals nationally); David Schimmel & Matthew Militello, Legal Literacy
for Teachers: A Neglected Responsibility, 77 HARV. EDUC. REV. 257, 261 (2007)
(surveying teachers in seventeen states); Lee E. Teitelbaum, School Discipline Procedures:
Some Empirical Findings and Some Theoretical Questions, 58 IND. L.J. 547, 560–61
(1983) (studying high school principals, counselors, and teachers in Indiana); John
Dominic Gascue, An Assessment of Nevada’s Secondary School Administrators’ Level
of Knowledge Regarding Procedural Due Process for Students 115–17 (1982) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of San Francisco) (surveying secondary school
principals and assistant principals in Nevada); Francie Velazquez, An Attitudinal Study
of School Administrators Towards Due Process and its Implications in an Urban
Massachusetts School District (May 1990) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University
of Massachusetts) (studying administrators in one urban district); see also Ellen Jane
Hollingsworth, The Impact of Student Rights and Discipline Cases on Schools, in 2
SCHOOLS & THE COURTS 45, 56–57 (Malcolm M. Feeley et al. eds. 1979) (surveying
Wisconsin junior and senior high school teachers). Hollingsworth’s study was the only
one that specifically examined the direction of the error, finding teachers thought
that Goss had provided more procedural rights to students than it had. For further
interpretation by one of her fellow researchers, see Henry S. Lufler, Jr., Unintended
Impact of Supreme Court School Discipline Decisions, in CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES
IN EDUCATION 102, 108 (M.A. McGhehey ed., 1979). Cf. Susan J. Hillman, Knowledge
of Legally Sanctioned Discipline Procedures by School Personnel 8, 12 (Apr. 1985),
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?
accno=ED263659 (finding 71% of principals but only 27% of counselors and 18% of
teachers had knowledge of all Goss rights in study of fifteen Indiana high schools).
23. See, e.g., Hollingsworth, supra note 22, at 59 (studying Wisconsin junior and
senior high school teachers); Lufler, supra note 22, at 102–03, 109 (studying Wisconsin
secondary school teachers in 1977); Julius Menacker, Teacher Fears of Parents Suits
and School Board Dismissals for Discipline Actions: Are They Justified?, 23 NOLPE
NOTES 1, 1 (Feb. 1988) (studying Chicago elementary school teachers in 1987). But cf.
Teitelbaum, supra note 22, at 561 (studying Indiana high school principals, counselors,
and teachers in 1981); Helen Ashwick, School Discipline Policies and Practices, BULL.
OERI 2 (Sept. 1986) (U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Educational Research and
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B. Case Law Frequency and Outcomes
The empirical research of pertinent pre-Goss case law is relatively limited.
Without clearly defining their data collection procedures, Clayton and
Jacobsen found 158 published court decisions concerning student rights,
including thirty suspension or expulsion cases, for the period from
1960–1971.24 They found that the vast majority of the suspension and
expulsion cases were during the last three years of this eleven-year
period and that students won 67% of these cases.25 Similarly, demarcating
his boundary as “published cases in which a student . . . challenged the
content of a school board rule or regulation” and citing as his source the
World Almanac and Book of Facts,26 Friedman found that the number of
student rights cases and their winning percentage was at a relatively low
level for each ten-year period from 1899–1908 to 1959–1968.27 The
number of student rights cases for 1969–1978 jumped more than tenfold
from the number of cases during the 1899–1908 period, and the winning
percentage tripled from the 1959–1968 period to 48%, but Friedman did
not disaggregate the data on each side of the date of Goss.28
The empirical research post-Goss is more extensive. In a study of
“[a]ll reported suspension and expulsion decisions from 1965–1987,”29
Lufler found that, rather than increasing, the frequency of PDP decisions
notably decreased in the wake of Goss.30 Moreover, he found that after

Improvement, Center for Statistics survey summary on file with the author) (finding
75%–80% of secondary principals nationally perceived Goss requirements as a small
operational burden, whereas 50%–67% perceived state and local procedural additions to
Goss as moderate or large operational burden).
24. Elwood M. Clayton & Gene S. Jacobsen, An Analysis of Court Cases
Concerned with Student Rights 1960–1971, 58 NASSP BULL. 49, 50–52 (1974). They
did not provide any further information as to the selection procedures or criteria, including
which decisions were based on PDP.
25. Id. at 50. They did not further identify, much less define, their outcome
classifications.
26. Lawrence M. Friedman, Limited Monarchy: The Rise and Fall of Student
Rights, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 238, 242–43 (David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen
eds., 1986).
27. Id. at 243. The average number of student rights cases for these decades was
13.8. The success rate for the plaintiff students was 16%. Id.
28. Id.
29. Lufler, supra note 17, at 2. The only operational boundary that Lufler offered
was that he used the “WestLaw headnote for suspension and expulsion” cases. Id. at 2
n.6. He divided the cases into two categories—procedural, which appears to correspond
at least approximately to what we refer to as PDP, and substantive, which he subdivided
into “five issue areas: hair and appearance, expression, drugs and alcohol, other
penalties, and a residual ‘other rules’ category.” Id. at 6.
30. Specifically, his five-year totals were as follows: 1965–69 = 10; 1970–74 = 49;
1975–79 = 27; 1980–84 = 17; and 1985–89 = 20 (extrapolated from a three-year total of
12). Id. at 5.
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Goss, the majority of the conclusive outcomes31 remained, and indeed
slightly increased, in favor of school authorities rather than students.32
In view of these findings, Lufler concluded that Goss “did not touch off
an explosion of new procedural cases, as commentators [had] predicted.”33
In a subsequent study covering the latter part of the same period (from
1979 to 1987) and limited to published decisions cited in the successive
Yearbooks of School Law,34 Lufler obtained similar results.35
More recently, in a book that gave primary attention to Goss,36 Arum and
one of his research associates, Beattie, included frequency and outcomes
analyses of the 1204 court decisions concerning student discipline from
1960 to 1992.37 Paralleling and extending Lufler’s purely PDP findings,
31. Lufler used two outcome categories, providing only one clarification: “If the
case was remanded without a final judgment, it was not counted at all.” Id. at 3.
32. Specifically, the percentage of the decisions that he reported in favor of the
district defendants for the five-year periods were as follows: 1965–69 = 60%; 1970–74 =
55%; 1975–79 = 56%; 1980–84 = 59%; 1985–87 = 67% (based on first three years of
this period). Id. at 5. He did not provide corresponding longitudinal outcomes data for
the substantive category and its subcategories, although he found that the overall
proportion in favor of district defendants for the substantive category was 61%. Id. at 9.
Nonempirical analyses of the Goss progeny between 1975 and 1988 generally support
the overall prevalence of the outcomes in favor of the school authorities. See, e.g.,
Dolores Cooper & John L. Strope, Jr., Short-Term Suspensions Fourteen Years Later, 58
EDUC. L. REP. 871, 881 (1990); Dolores J. Cooper & John L. Strope, Jr., Long-Term
Suspensions and Expulsions After Goss, 57 EDUC. L. REP. 29, 41 (1990).
33. Lufler, supra note 17, at 15. He included in tandem with Goss, the Court’s
decision in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), which is not the focus of the
present study and which, contrary to Lufler’s characterization, did not “extend[] student
procedural rights in school expulsion cases.” Lufler, supra note 17, at 5 n.8. The Wood
decision, in which the Court clothed school officials with qualified immunity from
liability in civil rights suits, arose as a result of a substantive due process violation. 420
U.S. at 310, 315.
34. This selection boundary is even less clear-cut and congruent with Goss,
because it depends on the classification by the chapter authors, who varied during this
period, into respective “suspension” and “expulsion” categories that included various
legal bases beyond PDP, such as the substantive subcategories in Lufler’s previous
study.
35. Lufler, supra note 19, at 211–12. Specifically, he found that the frequency of
suspension and expulsion decisions fluctuated from 1979 to 1989 and that—again with a
rather simplistic outcomes classification—the proportion in favor of districts was 75%.
Id. The differences are likely attributable to the lack of congruent time periods and
selection boundaries. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL AUTHORITY
38, 63 (2003) (portions co-authored with Irenee R. Beattie). Arum’s book contains other
research, but the study reported in the two chapters co-authored with Beattie are the
pertinent ones for the purpose of this Article.
37. Their rather vague selection criterion was that the court decisions “directly
involved individuals or organizations contesting a school’s right to discipline and control
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their results for the frequency of this broader line of decisions averaged
approximately eight per year for the period 1960–1968, increased
precipitously to a high point of one hundred in 1970 and dropped almost
as rapidly to a relatively stable average of approximately fifty per year in
the seventeen-year period since Goss.38 The average for the up-anddown six years from 1969 to 1975, which Arum and Beattie called the
“student rights contestation” period,39 was seventy-six cases per year.40
The respective annual averages for the suspension and expulsion cases were
approximately eight, fifty-seven, and twenty-nine for the successive periods
before, during, and after this designated contestation phase.41
In a separate chapter entitled How Judges Rule, Arum and his
associate provided the “predicted probability of a court decision in favor
of a student litigant” for these same cases.42 The results, which they
presented in graphical form, showed a steep increase from 36% in 1960
to the high point of 50% in 1968, then dropping to a brief plateau at 44%
students.” Id. at 16, 55–56. Their subsequent note that they used a specified LEXIS
search string helps provide clarification for replication, although it did not reference
whether and how they avoided the problem of double counting. Id. at 220; see infra note
61. However, various larger selection decisions are subject to question. For example,
they included cases in the private-, not just public-school context, thereby triggering
distinct legal bases and judicial postures. ARUM, supra note 36, at 17. Conversely, they
excluded federal district court decisions based on various questionable assumptions
concerning the publication and equivalence of state and federal court decisions. Id. at
49–50, 288 n.29. In any event, the extent of PDP overlap is unclear. Although they
obviously included substantive as well as procedural cases, the only categories that they
identified were in terms of the form of discipline (suspension, expulsion, corporal
punishment, transfer, and other discipline) and the type of student misbehavior (drugs,
alcohol, violence/weapons, political protest, and free expression). Id. at 55, 220.
38. ARUM, supra note 36, at 53.
39. Id. at 5, 60. Arum and Beattie referred to the period on each side of 1969–
1975, which is bounded at each end by Tinker and Goss, as “[p]re-[c]ontestation” and
“[p]ost-[c]ontestation.” Id. at 60, 67.
40. Id. at 18.
41. These extrapolated estimates are based on the proportions of suspension and
expulsion cases that Arum and Beattie provided for the three periods: 95% of the 1960–
1968 cases, 88% of the 1969–1975 cases, and 73% of the 1976–1992 cases. Id. at 55–
56. They did not specify the percentages for the PDP cases. In any event, Goss (1975)
marked the end, not the start of what they regarded as the contestation period, with,
instead, Tinker (1969) being the beginning.
42. ARUM, supra note 36, at 88. They rather cryptically defined this variable as
“the percentage likelihood of a pro-student outcome in a case, after controlling for how
the case was unusual with regard to other factors that influenced the outcomes, such as
region and type of student disciplinary infraction.” Id. at 88. Their explanation that the
predicted probabilities “were derived from logistic regression estimates of the effects of
several covariates on pro-student decisions” does not provide the requisite clarity, including
the absence of any definition of the basic outcome categorization of “pro-student.” Id. at
292 n.4. The results reported in their tables for underived “pro-school” and derived
“pro-student” decisions confound rather than resolve the matter. Id. at 217, 221.
Moreover, they do not appear to fit with the derived data in the graph or with the
findings of the other outcomes research reviewed herein.
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from 1972 to 1977—a period punctuated by Goss—and steadily and less
steeply declining to a low point of 35% in the final year of 1990.43
Although acknowledging that the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court,
took a “decidedly pro-school turn” in the period after Goss,44 Arum
interpreted these findings as resulting in “a historical legacy with two
prominent features”45—a student perception46 and an institutional norm
that both impeded discipline.47 More specifically, the purported effect
was that “schools were likely to reduce their disciplinary responses to
student misbehavior while at the same time students became less willing
to accept school authority or discipline as legitimate.”48 The primary problem
with this conclusion—possibly attributable in part to the eleven-year gap
between Arum’s findings and his interpretation—is that it ignores the
cumulating data in the post-contestation period.49 Although there is
undoubtedly a time lag, this student and school reaction would be
cyclical, causing a new generation’s organizational legacy in the
direction of discipline.

43. Id. at 88. Arum and Beattie did not explain why the graph ended in 1990
rather than 1992, but this disparity may be merely a matter of imprecise alignment.
44. Id. at 67. To support their contention, Arum and Beattie identified Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985); Board of Education v. McClusky, 458 U.S. 966 (1982); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247 (1978); and Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) as cases reflecting this
“pro-school turn.” ARUM, supra note 36, at 67–75. However, they missed for this
purpose (as compared with their narrower selection criteria) one major decision in the
same direction during this period that concerned control and indirectly concerned
discipline of students—Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–73
(1988).
45. ARUM, supra note 36, at 5–6.
46. Arum specifically described this perception as a “sense of legal entitlement
that . . . has produced skepticism about the legitimacy of school disciplinary practices as
well as a general familiarity with resorting to legal avenues to contest such practices.”
Id. at 6. Yet, apparently referring at least in part to his longitudinal outcomes analysis,
Arum acknowledged that this sense is “not firmly grounded in accurate understanding of
case and statutory law.” Id.
47. Arum described this institutional effect less clearly as “school forms, practices,
and culture—including widespread normative taken-for-granted assumptions about the
necessity of organizing school discipline in particular ways.” Id. at 6.
48. Id. at 13.
49. An additional problem is that this thesis regards Goss as a cause, when it may
well be that it was merely a reflection and effect of a broader societal movement. See,
e.g., Donal M. Sacken, Due Process and Democracy: Participation in School Disciplinary
Processes, 23 URB. EDUC. 323, 326–27 (1989).
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Although Arum’s frequency and outcomes data were for student
discipline case law more generally, in a follow-up Op-Ed piece, he
connected Goss to “students beg[inning] to assert newfound legal rights
when they were being disciplined for . . . now typically . . . cases that
largely involve school violence, weapons, drugs, and general misbehavior.”50
In a subsequent article, he repeated the mantra of the judicial erosion of
school authority, associating Goss with the “impossibility of school
discipline” and extending the connection to the tripling of the number of
incarcerated youths.51 Moreover, he imprecisely characterized the postGoss line of litigation as extending to “low-level punishments (e.g., inschool detention or lowering a grade).”52 Without providing any published
reference after 1992, when his reported data ended, Arum asserted that
“[i]n recent years, student and parental challenges to school discipline
have risen sharply, with the number of appellate cases more than
doubling from 1990 to 2000.”53 The results were even more lacking for
outcomes than frequency. Without providing any figures at all, Arum
implied that the decisions had been in favor of the plaintiffs rather than
the schools, not only for these cases overall,54 but also for the PDP cases
concerning low-level punishments.55
In light of these rather dramatic and diffused pronouncements and the
lack of more recent published data, the time is ripe for a systematic
update that, taking one step at a time, is limited to a specific PDP focus.
More specifically, this more refined systematic study of the direct lower
court progeny of Goss addresses two questions: First, whether the Goss
progeny56 in more recent years resurged in frequency, and second,
50. Arum, supra note 18.
51. Richard Arum, Sparing Rods, Spoiling Children: The Impossibility of School
Discipline, 56 NAT’L REV., Oct. 11, 2004, at 43, 43–44. He accorded second billing to
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), not making clear that it established qualified
immunity. Id. at 44. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for more on the Wood
case.
52. The imprecision was attributable to not providing a specific period of time
“[a]fter Goss,” vaguely referring to “student and parental challenges in court,” and using
the passive voice throughout his article. Arum, supra note 51, at 44.
53. Id.
54. This inference is based on the concomitant connection to the continued erosion
of school authorities’ discretion “on these issues.” See id.
55. This inference is based on his recommendation that courts stop providing
students with “due-process protections” for such “minor day-to-day discipline,” for
which he added restrictions on participation in interscholastic athletics as another
example. Id. He similarly did not provide any specific data on the Goss-type cases
concerning more severe forms of discipline, while recommending “full due-process
protections” for long-term or permanent exclusions from school. Id.
56. The seemingly incidental and, in any event, unexplained graph in Underwood’s
Goss anniversary address does not come close to filling this gap. Containing no title and
not accompanied by any introduction or discussion, it appears to show merely the
number of lower court decisions that have cited Goss from 1975 to 2004. Underwood,
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whether the Goss progeny in more recent years shifted outcomes back in
the direction of the plaintiff-student. In addition, “systematic” study also
means addressing other limitations in the previous line of research,
which primarily fit in two categories: (1) lack of precise selection
information, which is necessary for replication and interpretation,57 and
(2) the lack of a systematic outcome classification, which provides
sufficient differentiation of mixed and inconclusive rulings.58 The first
category more specifically includes the lack of precise selection criteria,
the mixing of other discipline decisions with those based on PDP,59
which was the essence of the Goss decision,60 and search procedures that
avoid double counting, yet identify the latest pertinent published ruling
for each case.61
IV. METHODOLOGY
In light of the data collection shortcomings in previous studies,62 this
study uses specific criteria and procedures for the selection of court
decisions for the empirical analysis, including, but extending beyond,
defining their “published”63 status within the twenty-year timeframe of
1986–2005.64
supra note 1, at 798. Although the descending and then roughly level slope is somewhat
similar to Arum and Beattie’s frequency graph, citations of Goss are obviously a far cry
from student discipline cases that fit within its boundaries.
57. See supra notes 24, 26, 29, 34, and 37 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 25, 27, 31, and 42 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 24, 26, 29, 34, and 37 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
61. Electronic databases are susceptible to double counting, but when used carefully,
allow for resolving this problem. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The “Explosion” in Education
Litigation: An Update, 114 EDUC. L. REP. 341, 343–44 n.20 (1997). For systematic study
limited to a single issue, such as PDP in student discipline cases, the added necessary
step—which this study took—was to track each case to its most recent published
decision on this issue, eliminating the citations to the earlier rulings and only citing, not
counting, the later rulings on other grounds.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 59, and 60.
63. The study did not include decisions available through electronic databases,
such as LEXIS and Westlaw, but not published in official reporters, such as “F. Supp.”
and “F.3d.” See, e.g., Gendelman v. Glenbrook North High School, No. 03-C-3288,
2003 WL 21209880 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2003); Caston v. Benton Pub. Schs., No.
4:00CV00215WKU, 2002 WL 562638 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 11, 2002); Witvoet v. Herscher
Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., No. 97-CV-2243, 1998 WL 1562916 (C.D. Ill. May 27, 1998);
Anvar v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. B178912, 2005 WL 2789331 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
27, 2005); Fortune v. City of Detroit Pub. Sch., No. 248306, 2004 WL 2291333 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004). Additionally, we did not include decisions available only in
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First, the study included only those decisions that arose in K-12
schools, not other contexts. Therefore, suspension and expulsion decisions
that arose in private schools65 or post-secondary institutions66 were
excluded.
Second, the study only included cases where at least one basis of the
court’s decision was Fourteenth Amendment PDP in terms of the Goss
notice/hearing rationale, or state-law PDP that expanded upon Goss’s
procedural protections.67 Thus, for example, if the plaintiff was a special
education student who raised, and the court decided, issues based on the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Fourteenth
Amendment or state-law PDP, the study included the case but only
considered the PDP ruling.68 As a result, the analysis excluded suspension
or expulsion decisions where the court relied solely on other grounds,
such as: (1) Fourteenth Amendment void-for-vagueness,69 which is only
partly, and not predominantly, a matter of PDP,70 (2) Fourteenth Amendment
Substantive Due Process,71 (3) First Amendment expression,72 or (4) the
state reporters, such as state trial court decisions not available in official regional
reporters. See, e.g., Mullane v. Wyalusing Area School District, 30 Pa. D. & C. 4th 179
(C.P. 1996). Nevertheless, we used multiple sources to be as exhaustive as possible
within our prescribed boundaries, carefully culling out cases that did not fit. These
sources included: (1) The Westlaw key numbers for student discipline, with the search
terms Goss or due process; (2) the Education Law Association’s YEARBOOK OF SCHOOL
LAW for each previous year in the study’s period; (3) the index references under suspension
and expulsion in the leading education law texts; and (4) a LEXIS Boolean search in its
education law database.
64. More specifically, the boundaries for the date of decision were January 1, 1986
to December 31, 2005.
65. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Don Bosco Preparatory High, 730 A.2d 365, 367 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Allen v. Casper, 622 N.E.2d 367, 368 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
66. See, e.g., Brown v. W. Conn. State Univ., 204 F. Supp. 2d 355, 356 (D. Conn.
2002); Hill v. Bd. of Tr. of Mich. State Univ., 182 F. Supp. 2d 621, 623 (W.D. Mich.
2001).
67. For decisions based on the threshold step of whether procedural process is due,
see infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., S.W. v. Holbrook Pub. Sch., 221 F. Supp. 2d 222, 225, 229 (D. Mass.
2002); Waln v. Todd County Sch. Dist., 388 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000, 1003 (D.S.D. 2005).
69. See, e.g., Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117, 135 (Conn.
1998); Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 693 A.2d 655, 656–57 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1997).
70. The other, and weightier, component is generally understood to be substantive
due process. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (concluding
that the void-for-vagueness doctrine was more a matter of “arbitrary . . . enforcement,”
that is, substantive due process, than “actual notice,” that is, procedural due process
(citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974))).
71. See, e.g., Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2000); Commons v. Westlake
City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 672 N.E.2d 1098, 1104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
72. See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 626–27 (8th
Cir. 2002). Additionally, by extension, we excluded suspension and expulsion cases
based on the overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist.,
976 F. Supp. 659, 671 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
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IDEA.73 Similarly, the study did not include cases where the decision
was based on a threshold issue, such as subject matter jurisdiction74 or
separable, post-PDP proceedings.75
Last, the study included only those decisions in which the court determined
that school authorities had deprived the student of the requisite PDP
liberty or property interest. Thus, the study did not include court decisions
where the student claimed, but the court rejected, such a deprivation.
Examples of such exclusions were those where: (1) the school’s action was
limited to removing the student from extracurricular activities,76 (2) school
authorities purportedly suspended or expelled the student, but the court
concluded that the student had suffered no cognizable educational loss,77
and (3) school authorities took disciplinary action, regardless of whether
or not they characterized it as a suspension or expulsion, but the court
did not apply PDP based on the conclusion that the deprivation was de

73. See, e.g., Farrin v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 59, 165 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40 (D.
Me. 2001); Magyar v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1423, 1446 (D. Ariz.
1997).
74. See, e.g., Webb v. Ironton City Sch., 686 N.E.2d 285, 288 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996); In re JAD, 782 A.2d 1069, 1071 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); cf. D.L. v. Unified Sch.
Dist., No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) (vacating due to Younger abstention
doctrine); Stephenson v. Davenport Cmty. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that plaintiff failed to comply with exhaustion doctrine); State ex rel.
Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 325, 330 (Mo. 1995) (holding that case was in improper
venue).
75. See, e.g., Cohn v. New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 421, 432–33
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting student’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 PDP claim due to adequate postdeprivation remedies).
76. See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 1989); Smith v.
Chippewa Falls Area Unified Sch. Dist., 302 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (W.D. Wis. 2002);
Wooten v. Pleasant Hope R-VI Sch. Dist., 139 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840, 842 (W.D. Mo.
2000); Brands v. Sheldon Cmty. Sch., 671 F. Supp. 627, 631 (N.D. Iowa 1987); Ryan v.
Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n—San Diego Section, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 798, 807 (Ct. App.
2001); L.P.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole County, 753 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000); Jordan v. O’Fallon Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 203 Bd. of Educ., 706 N.E.2d 137,
140, 141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). The exceptions, which we included in the analysis based
on the courts’ ruling on the second step of the PDP framework, were Palmer v. Merluzzi,
868 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F.2d
1309, 1323–24 (7th Cir. 1988); and Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin School District, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 1038, 1053 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
77. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1192–93
(D. Nev. 2005) (ruling that no loss of property interest resulted from school’s expulsion
because parents subsequently home-schooled the student); Gonzalez v. Torres, 915 F.
Supp. 511, 517 (D.P.R. 1996) (finding no deprivation where student voluntarily
transferred out of school before serving the expulsion).
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minimis for Goss purposes,78 including, but not limited to, situations
where school authorities transferred the student either to another school79
or, in the majority of cases,80 to an alternative education program.81
The following empirical analyses are in terms of frequency and
outcomes, both of which have particular meanings in the context of this
study. “Frequency” has two applications with regard to this empirical
analysis. First, it refers, per the customary meaning, to the number, or
volume, of relevant cases during a given time period.82 Second, for
more precision in the subsequent analysis accompanying the tabulation
78. See, e.g., Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1080–81 (5th
Cir. 1995) (addressing brief incarcerating isolation); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855
F.2d 560, 562–63 (8th Cir. 1988) (addressing in-school suspension); Casey v. Newport
Sch. Comm., 13 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246 (D.R.I. 1998) (discussing removal of student from
science class); Rasmus v. Arizona, 939 F. Supp. 709, 716–17 (D. Ariz. 1996) (involving
a ten-minute time-out); Obersteller v. Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 874 F. Supp. 146,
148 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (involving a punitive grade); Dickens v. Johnson County Bd. of
Educ., 661 F. Supp. 155, 157–58 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (addressing a time-out); Slocum v.
Holton Bd. of Educ., 429 N.W.2d 607, 611–12 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing a
grade reduction resulting from student’s failure to comply with attendance policy);
Zellman v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2758, 594 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)
(involving a zero grade for plagiarized project); cf. Hayes v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 377,
669 F. Supp. 1519, 1528 (D. Kan. 1987) (addressing a time-out used as “in-school
suspension”), rev’d on other grounds, 877 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1989). On the other hand,
we included cases in which the action was not a disciplinary out-of-school suspension or
expulsion but the court concluded that PDP applied due to a sufficient deprivation of
property or liberty. See, e.g., Ala. & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of Big Sandy
Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1335 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (involving extended inschool detention); Gamble v. Ware County Bd. of Educ., 561 S.E.2d 837, 844 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002) (addressing the placement of seriously stigmatizing entry in student’s
record); Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So. 2d 455, 458 (Miss. 1986)
(discussing loss of semester credit). Similarly, the study included cases where the court
reached the PDP issue even though the school authorities did not characterize the
disciplinary action as a suspension or expulsion and regardless of whether the court
concluded that they deprived the student of the requisite liberty or property interest. See,
e.g., M.S. ex rel. P.S. v. Eagle Union Cmty. Sch. Corp., 717 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind.
App. Ct. 1999) (concerning removal from course).
79. See, e.g., Murphy v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 2d 569, 573
(N.D. Tex. 2003), vacated as moot, 334 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2003), cf. Seamons v. Snow,
84 F.3d 1226, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 206 F.3d 1021, 1028
(10th Cir. 2000).
80. The exceptions were cases where the court ruled that the alternative school
transfer was a de facto suspension or expulsion due to an effectively different, inferior
level of education. We included these cases in our analysis. See, e.g., Porter v.
Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 623–24 (5th Cir. 2004).
81. See, e.g., Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26–27
(5th Cir. 1997); Marner v. Eufaula City Sch. Bd., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323–24 (M.D.
Ala. 2002); Stafford Mun. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 64 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. App. 2001);
Riggan v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647, 655 (W.D. Tex. 2000)
(indicating that assignment to an alternative education program that effectively acts as an
exclusion from the educational process may implicate due process rights).
82. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Special Education Case Law:
An Empirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. L. REP. 731, 732 (2002).
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of outcomes, the study follows the model of previous articles that counted
issue rulings.83 More specifically, an “issue ruling” within this study’s
framework refers to the ultimate judgment on a PDP issue. Here, “ultimate”
means the highest court ruling on said issue.84 In turn, PDP in this
context consists of two categories:85 (1) “Federal rulings,” that is, those
in which the court either relied strictly on,86 or applied its extrapolated
interpretation of, 87 Goss in its decision,88 or (2) “State Law rulings,”
that is, those where the court relied on state statutes or regulations that
did not simply codify89 but expand Goss.90 Finally, “issue” in this analysis
refers to Federal and State Law rulings for each of two disciplinary
actions—removals of up to ten school days and those for more than ten

83. See, e.g., Margaret M. McMenamin & Perry A. Zirkel, OCR Rulings Under
Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Higher Education Student Cases,
16 J. POSTSECONDARY EDUC. & DISABILITY 55, 56 (2003); Perry A. Zirkel, Section 504
and Public School Students: An Empirical Overview, 120 EDUC. L. REP. 369, 369–73
(1997).
84. On the other hand, if the case had further published proceedings for issues
other than PDP, its analysis is based on the last relevant ruling, even though there may
have been subsequent published proceedings. See, e.g., Tun v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch.,
326 F. Supp. 2d 932, 941–45 (N.D. Ind. 2004), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Tun v.
Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2005). Conversely, if the case had an earlier
published decision on other grounds, said earlier decision was not included in this
analysis. Compare, e.g., Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 714 A.2d
1012, 1015 (Pa. 1998) (holding that the school district gave student adequate notice of
the charges that furnished the bases for student’s suspension) with Hamilton v. UnionChadds Ford Sch. Dist., 693 A.2d 655, 656–57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (holding that
student’s expulsion was improper under the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
85. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
86. In terms of the Court’s holding, Goss only addressed exclusions from school
from one to ten days. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
87. These court decisions used the Goss rationale and dicta for exclusions of more
than ten days. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
88. In either event, these Federal rulings were based on Fourteenth Amendment
PDP.
89. Conversely, the data in this study, in terms of both frequency and outcomes,
classifies those rulings based on a state law that, in pertinent part, echoes the
prescriptions in Goss as Federal issue rulings. See, e.g., Katchak v. Glasgow Indep. Sch.
Dist., 690 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Ky. 1988).
90. These rulings encompass the PDP framework established not only for the
subcategories of up-to-ten days and more-than-ten days, but also—depending on the
state—for specified periods within the ten-day subcategory. See, e.g., Wayne County
Bd. of Educ. v. Tyre, 404 S.E.2d 809, 810–11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling on three-day
suspension); Burns v. Hitchcock, 683 A.2d 1322, 1323–24 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)
(ruling on ten-day suspension); J.M. v. Webster County Bd. of Educ., 534 S.E.2d 50, 54–
59 (W. Va. 2000) (ruling on one-year expulsion).
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school days.91 In the few cases where the court ruled on more than one
Federal or State Law claim within one of these two separate disciplinary
actions, the study aggregated the claims into one ruling, except where there
was a difference in outcomes.92
Similarly, “outcomes” has a more precise definition that goes beyond
a simple won-lost dichotomy. Specifically, following the lead of other
outcomes analyses that used more sophisticated and customized
classifications,93 this study used the following five-point scale:







1 = conclusive decision in favor of the student,94
2 = inconclusive decision in favor of the student,95
3 = inconclusive for both parties,96
4 = inconclusive decision in favor of the school district,97 and
5 = conclusive victory in favor of the school district.98

91. Where the court ruled on both disciplinary actions separately, we included
each of these rulings in our tabulation. Moreover, in the relatively few cases where the
court included both Federal and State Law rulings in relation to one of these disciplinary
actions, we tabulated these rulings separately in the analysis.
92. See, e.g., Colquitt v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 227, 699 N.E.2d 1109,
1113, 1116–17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (categorizing issue rulings into “5” for rejection of
student’s claim of entitlement to verbatim transcript and “1” for agreement with claim
that reliance on hearsay evidence violated PDP). For an example limited to a requested
preliminary injunction and, thus, classified as inconclusive due to the potential for final
proceedings, see Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 928 (6th Cir.
1988). In this case, where the trial court dismissed the student’s request for a preliminary
injunction against a removal of more than ten days, the appellate court rejected the
student’s claims of (1) lack of cross examination or at least identification of student
witnesses, (2) lack of cross examination of school administrators, and (3) improper
participation in board hearing by administrators who recommended expulsion, but ruled
in the student’s favor on the student’s claim that the same administrators improperly
provided the board with evidence not shared with the student. Id. at 920. Thus, the
study recorded issue rulings of “4” and “2” for this case.
93. See, e.g., William H. Lupini & Perry A. Zirkel, An Outcomes Analysis of
Education Litigation, 17 EDUC. POL’Y 257, 263–64 (2003) (utilizing a seven-point
scale); James R. Newcomer & Perry A. Zirkel, An Analysis of Judicial Outcomes of
Special Education Cases, 65 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 469, 472 (1999) (using a five-point
outcome scale); Zirkel & D’Angelo, supra note 82, at 738 (employing a three-category
scale).
94. This category extends to (1) cases in which the student was successful and the
remedy was a remand to the school board for a new hearing, or (2) successful student
motions for summary judgment.
95. This category consists of (1) successful student motions for preliminary
injunction, (2) unsuccessful district motions for dismissal or summary judgment, and
(3) cases in which the student was successful, but the remedy was limited to a remand to
the trial court.
96. This category is limited to cases in which both parties moved unsuccessfully
for summary judgment.
97. This category consists of unsuccessful student motions for (1) a preliminary
injunction or (2) summary judgment.
98. This category extends to successful district motions for (1) dismissal or
(2) summary judgment.
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V. RESULTS
Using multiple sources,99 the study found a total of 165 cases yielding
191 issue rulings.100 The outcome results for overall101 issue rulings were:





12% (n = 22)—conclusive decision in favor of the student,102
7% (n = 13)—inconclusive decision in favor of the student,
0% (n = 0)—inconclusive for both parties,103

99. See supra note 63.
100. The list of citations and tabular entries is available from the first author upon
request.
101. Overall in this context refers to the total of Federal and State Law PDP rulings
together. The outcome distributions for each of these five successive subcategories—
from conclusive for students to conclusive for districts—were as follows:
Federal: 6% (n = 8); 8% (n = 11); 0% (n = 0); 7% (n = 10); 79% (n=110).
State Law: 27% (n = 14); 4% (n = 2); 0% (n = 0); 6% (n = 3); 63% (n = 33).
102. For the twenty-three issue rulings conclusively in favor of the students, the
predominant remedies, in the cases where the court expressly specified the relief, were
remand for a new school board hearing (n =7), expungement of the student’s record (n = 4),
and reinstatement (n = 3). For cases involving remand, see Colvin v. Lowndes County
Sch. Dist., 114 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 (N.D. Miss. 1999); Nichols v. DeStefano, 70 P.3d
505, 508 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d by an equally divided court, 84 P.3d 496 (Colo.
2004); In re Expulsion of Z.K., 695 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); In re
Expulsion of E.J.W., 632 N.W.2d 775, 783 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Yatron v. Hamburg
Area Sch. Dist., 631 A.2d 758, 762 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993); Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub.
Educ. v. MJN, 524 A.2d 1385, 1390 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987); Stone v. Prosser Consol.
Sch. Dist. No. 116, 971 P.2d 125, 128 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). For cases addressing
expungement, see Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So. 2d 455, 458 (Miss.
1986); Ruef v. Jordan, 605 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Adrovet v.
Brunswick City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 735 N.E.2d 995, 999–1000 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl.
1999); Hardesty v. River View Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 620 N.E.2d 272, 275 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. 1993). For cases dealing with reinstatement, see Murphy v. Fort Worth
Indep. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (N.D. Tex. 2003), vacated as moot, 334 F.3d
470 (5th Cir. 2003); Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 449, 459–
60 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Doe v. Rockingham County Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 403, 406, 410
(W.D. Va. 1987). Additionally, in only one of the twenty-three conclusive rulings in
favor of the student did the court expressly provide for money damages, and even then
only awarded a nominal amount. See Warren County Bd. of Educ., 500 So. 2d at 458
(awarding one dollar); cf. Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 460 (scheduling a subsequent
hearing for money damages that were presumably attributable to federal constitutional
violations of free speech and vagueness, rather than PDP). Finally, the court awarded
attorney’s fees in only two cases. See Doe, 658 F. Supp. at 411 (awarding, presumably in
full, attorney’s fees and costs); Warren County Bd. of Educ., 500 So. 2d at 458 (awarding
only $1,000, which was less than ample in light of litigation spanning from the state’s
chancery court to the state’s highest courts, and which was couched as an addition to the
nominal one dollar awarded as damages).
103. Because there were no inconclusive rulings for both parties, the figures for
outcomes do not include an entry for classification “3.”
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7% (n = 13)—inconclusive decision in favor of the school
district, and
74% (n = 143)—conclusive victory in favor of the school
district.104

Figure 1 displays the frequency of cases and issue rulings per fiveyear interval.105

Figure 1. Frequency of Cases and Issue Rulings: Overall
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Examination of Figure 1 illustrates a consistent upward trend in both
categories.

104. In one of these cases, the court went so far as requiring the student’s attorney
to pay $100,000, as a sanction, for the district’s attorney’s fees. Giangrasso v. Kittatinny
Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 865 F. Supp. 1133, 1142–43 (D.N.J. 1994).
105. The juxtaposition of these two units of analysis provides a means of
transitioning from the measures employed most frequently in previous research—“cases”
(representing court decisions)—to the more precise measure in this study—“issue
rulings” (representing PDP issue rulings).

370

ZIRKEL.DOC

9/4/2008 11:02:49 AM

The Goss Progeny:An Empirical Analysis

[VOL. 45: 353, 2008]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Figure 2 divides the frequency of issue rulings into Federal and State
Law subgroups.106

Figure 2. Frequency of Issue Rulings: Federal and State Law
50
46

45

42

40
35

Number

30
26

25

Federal
State Law

25
20

20
15

14

15
10
5

3

0
1986-1990

1991-1995

1996-2000

2001-2005

Time Period

Figure 2 shows a steady increase for each of the successive five-year
periods for the Federal rulings. In partial contrast, State Law rulings increased
initially, but the three most recent five-year periods approximated an
uneven plateau rather than a continuing steep upslope.
Figure 3 presents the outcome results for each of the successive fiveyear periods.

106. By broadening the analysis to a discussion of PDP issue rulings, the study
allows for more meticulous scrutiny by accounting for those decisions that have both a
Goss and state law basis. Thus, by approaching the data in this more nuanced fashion,
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Figure 3. Outcome of Issue Rulings: Overall
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Figure 3 shows that the overall trend in outcomes has rather clearly
and consistently been in favor of school districts. For conclusive
rulings, being those at the polar positions (that is, “1” in favor of the
student, and “5” in favor of the school district), students fared slightly
better in the first and most recent period, but districts won approximately
70%–75% throughout the twenty-year span.
Figures 4 and 5 are derivatives of Figure 3 and offer a means for
comparing the outcomes of Federal and State Law issue rulings.

the study avoids wrongfully pigeonholing a court decision as being based solely on
Fourteenth Amendment PDP or state statutes or regulations.
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Figure 4. Outcome of Issue Rulings: Federal
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Figure 4, which displays the outcome results for the Federal issue rulings,
reveals that the trend in favor of school districts for this subgroup is even
more pronounced than in Figure 3.

Figure 5. Outcome of Issue Rulings: State Law
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Figure 5, which presents the results for issue rulings based on state
statutes and regulations, evidences a more variable trend. Generally,
however, students fared better in these issue rulings than those based on
Fourteenth Amendment PDP, although the outcomes were, for the most
part, still in favor of the districts. Most notably, students won the majority
of the conclusive rulings for the most recent five-year period. However,
as Figure 2 revealed, these percentages are based on comparatively
lower numbers of issue rulings.
VI. DISCUSSION
Overall, the findings of this study were that: (1) the Goss progeny has
generally increased during the most recent twenty years, and (2) the
outcomes during this recent period have strongly favored school
authorities.
A. Frequency
The tabular data for overall frequency show a steady increase in the
number of court decisions during the study’s twenty-year span. This
rather clear-cut pattern is only partially in line with previous studies.
More specifically, Lufler found a notable decrease in the volume of PDP
cases in the two five-year periods following Goss, but the extrapolated
results for the 1985–1989 period, which overlaps with this study’s initial
five-year period, seem to foreshadow the upturn in frequency that this
study found.107 Similarly, Arum’s initial study, which was not limited to
PDP cases, reported a moderately fluctuating frequency during the
seventeen-year period following Goss;108 although, in a more recent article,
he referred in passing to an ascending arc for the years 1990–2000.109
A more precise measure of frequency than court decisions, or cases, is
the disposition specific to the PDP claim, herein referred to plurally as
“rulings.”110 Figure 1 reveals a pattern for rulings parallel to the pattern
for cases, with the exception of a possible leveling between the last two
five-year periods. The source of this recent change is revealed in Figure 2,
which disaggregates the frequency data, juxtaposing those rulings based

107. Although Lufler’s extrapolated results for the years 1985–1989 showed only a
slight increase in cases from the previous five-year period, they signaled a possible
reversal from the downward trend exhibited during the fifteen-year period beginning in
1975. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
109. Arum, supra note 51, at 44.
110. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.

374

ZIRKEL.DOC

[VOL. 45: 353, 2008]

9/4/2008 11:02:49 AM

The Goss Progeny:An Empirical Analysis
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

on the Fourteenth Amendment, herein referred to as “Federal,” with
those based on state statutes or regulations, herein referred to as “State
Law.” The Federal rulings follow a steady upward trajectory; thus, the
slowed growth is not attributable to them. In contrast, the growth in
State Law rulings is unsustained and, particularly during the final three
five-year periods, the pattern appears to plateau; thus, the state data
appear to account for the recent slowed growth in the overall volume of
rulings.
Although the growth in Federal rulings is rather clear, the reason for it
is not. The outcomes of the cases do not provide, at least directly, an
explanation. Indeed, one would expect the increasingly school districtfriendly outcomes to decelerate, rather than stimulate, legal challenges.
Therefore, it is likely that students and their attorneys were largely
unaware of their limited and declining odds of success. This lack of
outcomes information may be attributable to the time lag between the
emergence of a detectable trend and the dissemination of the resulting
scholarly research.
Furthermore, it is possible that student-plaintiffs were not only ill
informed, but also misinformed. That is to say, the probable lack of
outcomes data, which may have curtailed plaintiffs’ lawsuits, was
perhaps compounded by skewed media reports, which may have in turn
heightened plaintiffs’ legal expectations. More specifically, the publicity of
exceptional cases, content on special-interest websites, and articles
written by academic professionals may have collectively reinforced, or
even fostered, mistaken assumptions about the probability of prevailing
on a disciplinary challenge.111
Finally, a contributing factor to the growth of Federal rulings may be
the zero-tolerance approach, which took shape starting with the Gun
Free Schools Act of 1994112 and quickly expanded to a whole host of
student infractions relating to violence and drugs.113 This draconian

111. See supra notes 19–21, 51–55 and accompanying text.
112. Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994) (repealed by No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1011(5), 115 Stat. 1425, 1986
(2002)). The No Child Left Behind Act repealed and then reauthorized the Gun-Free
Schools Act with some slight clarifications and modifications.
113. See, e.g., RONNIE CASELLA, AT ZERO TOLERANCE: PUNISHMENT, PREVENTION,
AND SCHOOL VIOLENCE 24–25 (2001); Russell J. Skiba & Kimberly Knesting, Zero
Tolerance, Zero Evidence: An Analysis of School Disciplinary Practice, in ZERO
TOLERANCE: CAN SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION KEEP SCHOOLS SAFE? 17, 22–24 (Russell
J. Skiba & Gil G. Noam eds., 2001); Robert C. Cloud, Due Process and Zero Tolerance:
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approach, which typically provides for expulsions of one year or more
with limited discretionary exceptions, obviously made such disciplinary
actions high stakes for the expelled students and an undisputed denial of
property and liberty interests under Fourteenth Amendment PDP, thus
increasing the incentive for making a federal case of the matter.114
The overall pattern of State Law rulings—which, although approximating
more of an uneven plateau for the three most recent five-year periods,
initially paralleled the growth in Federal rulings—also lacks an obvious
explanation. One might have expected greater growth in State Law than
Federal rulings in light of their more favorable outcomes during the
entire period.115 However, with due caution for the small number of
rulings (particularly the total of only three rulings for the 1986–1990
period), this disconnect between frequency and outcomes may also be
attributable in part to information and opportunity.
First, this differential pattern for State Law rulings may be based on
insufficient or misleading information. More specifically, the information
generally available to the parents and attorneys of suspended or expelled
students about the outcomes of PDP litigation would seem to connect
their prospects for successful suits to Goss and, by extension, to claims
under federal law. For example, Arum’s Washington Post Op-Ed piece
asserted that Goss created for students “newfound legal rights . . . and
entitlements in cases that largely involve school violence, weapons, drugs
and general misbehavior.”116 The reader’s inference is that the appropriate
avenue for disciplinary challenges is Fourteenth Amendment PDP, which
was the basis for Goss. In contrast, there is no implicit recommendation
to resort to state legislation or regulations, which can offer PDP protections
that go beyond those in Goss.117 Thus, the public highlighting of Goss in
relation to students’ rights could be the basis for plaintiff attorneys’
seeming preference to rely on federal, rather than state, claims of PDP.
Second, depending on the time and location of the suit, the plaintiff
attorneys may not have had the luxury of availing their clients of greater
procedural protections under state statutes and regulations. More
An Uneasy Alliance, 178 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2–3 (2003); Darcia Harris Bowman, Interpretations
of “Zero Tolerance” Vary, EDUC. WK., Apr. 10, 2002, at 1.
114. This factor would also appear to contribute to State Law rulings, at least in
states that provide added PDP protections, but—as discussed infra—the pattern did not
follow suit for the most recent five-year period.
115. See supra Figures 4–5.
116. Arum, supra note 18.
117. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.47(9) (West 2008) (giving students the
right to confront and cross examine witnesses at disciplinary hearing); 22 PA. CODE
§ 12.8 (2008) (requiring a formal hearing in all expulsion actions); ARK. CODE ANN. § 618-507(c)(1)–(2) (2007) (providing students the right to appeal suspensions to the school
board or superintendent).
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specifically, the suspension or expulsion may have arisen in a state that
either lacked a law providing stronger procedural protection or that
previously had such a law but eliminated it prior to the suit. Although
systematic data specific to state PDP protections for students are not
available,118 it may well be that as the societal pendulum swung away
from student rights, some states may have reduced or removed their
procedural protections that went beyond Goss.119 Thus, in an undetermined
and perhaps increasing number of states, students’ attorneys may have
had no choice but to base their claims exclusively on Fourteenth
Amendment PDP.
Third, the significant disparity between Federal and State Law PDP
outcomes may be due to the availability of certain remedies through only
one avenue, not the other. For example, attorney’s fees in Goss-type
cases are available to prevailing plaintiffs for their federal law claims,
not—in most jurisdictions—their state law claims.120 Although, in itself,
this advantage may not prove decisive for an attorney weighing the
benefits of raising a PDP claim under either federal or state law, it adds
to the two foregoing factors that contribute to a federal claim.
B. Outcomes
In contrast to the steadily increasing pattern in overall frequency, the
pattern for overall outcomes on an issue by issue basis is rather steady—
and, for students, quite bleak. Indeed, the situation for plaintiff-students
is even darker than the overall PDP outcomes indicate121 given that:

118. The Education Commission of the States tracks state laws for suspension and
expulsion, but the compilation is limited to the past six to seven years and lacks any
systematic categorization. See, e.g., EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES, ECS
STATENOTES 2006 COLLECTION 1–4 (2006), http://ecs.org/html/educationIssues/StateNotes/2006
StateNotes.pdf (failing to show a category for discipline).
119. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, National Trends in Education Litigation: Supreme
Court Decisions Concerning Students, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 235, 242 (1998).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)–(c) (2000). Statutory counterparts in State Law rulings
are rare and only indirectly connected to PDP. See, e.g., Achman v. Chisago Lakes
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2144, 45 F. Supp. 2d 664, 669 (D. Minn. 1999) (discussing a
Minnesota statute that enables “a person ‘who suffers any damages as a result of [a
Minnesota Data Practices Act] violation’ . . . to recover ‘any damages sustained, plus costs
and reasonable attorney fees.’” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 13.08(1) (2007))).
121. On the other hand, the plaintiff students won at a higher rate on a case-by-case
basis if one analyzed the overall outcome to include their alternative claims, such as First
Amendment expression or Fourth Amendment search and seizure, not just their PDP
claims alone.

377

ZIRKEL.DOC

9/4/2008 11:02:49 AM

(1) these data do not include the completely adverse results for students
in the cases where the court regarded the disciplinary action or effect as
de minimis,122 and (2) the comparatively few conclusive rulings in favor
of the student often yielded nominal remedies, including a remand to the
school board for a new hearing.123 The outcomes specific to Federal
rulings are even more dramatically in favor of school districts, albeit
with a rather oscillating pattern for the conclusive district victories. In
contrast, the outcome results for State Law rulings present a more
favorable outlook for students, particularly in the final five-year period.
The clear-cut pattern for overall outcomes is in line with, and extends,
the findings of previous studies, although both Lufler’s and Arum’s
methodologies differ from the present study’s methodology in terms of
scope124 and specificity.125 More specifically, both Lufler and Arum
found that school districts won an increasing majority of cases in the
fifteen-year period following Goss.126 Our findings, which focused more
narrowly on PDP, were congruent with these previous studies for the
overlapping period in the second half of the 1980s and seemed to

122. See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text. Conversely, we included in
our analysis cases where the court either accorded or assumed the requisite liberty or
property denial. Some of these cases were extracurricular exclusions. See supra note 76
and accompanying text. The other cases pertained to in-school suspensions. See, e.g.,
Cole v. Newton Special Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 676 F. Supp. 749, 752 (S.D. Miss.
1987), aff’d, 853 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1988) (ruling that denial “would depend on the
extent to which the student was deprived of instruction or the opportunity to learn.”);
Orange v. County of Grundy, 950 F. Supp. 1365, 1372 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) (avoiding issue
of whether plaintiffs were deprived of a property or liberty interest in light of district’s
failure to dispute it).
123. See supra note 102. The rarity of awards of money damages is attributable in
notable part to defendant-friendly precedents in terms of qualified immunity for school
officials, the hurdles for institutional liability, and the need for actual injury. See, e.g.,
Newsome v. Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 928 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring
plaintiff to show actual injury to the extent plaintiff seeks money damages); Posthumus
v. Bd. of Educ. of Mona Shores Pub. Sch., 380 F. Supp. 2d 891, 896–98 (W.D. Mich.
2005) (undertaking a qualified immunity analysis); Jacobs v. Clark County Sch. Dist.,
373 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1193 (D. Nev. 2005) (requiring plaintiff to show actual injury);
Tun v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 326 F. Supp. 2d 932, 938–39 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (finding
the school district lacks institutional liability), rev’d on other grounds, Tun v. Whitticker,
398 F.3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2005); Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d
195, 208 (D. Mass. 2003) (finding the school district is entitled to qualified immunity);
cf. Warren County Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson, 500 So. 2d 455, 458 (Miss. 1986)
(granting requested injunction without actually reviewing the actions of the Board).
124. In contrast with our study, Lufler’s outcomes analysis was limited to cases
with conclusive rulings, see supra note 31, and Arum’s selection criteria excluded
federal district court decisions, see supra note 37.
125. In contrast with our study, neither Lufler nor Arum disaggregated their data,
either for frequency or outcomes, into Fourteenth Amendment PDP and state law PDP
subcategories.
126. See supra notes 32, 42, 43, and accompanying text.
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suggest a saturation, or ceiling, effect in the 1990s, particularly for the
Federal, as compared with State Law, PDP rulings.
The primary reasons for the pattern in overall outcomes are two
overlapping societal and judicial trends. More specifically, the applicable
societal trend is the general shift from individual rights to collective
welfare in the school context, whereas the concurrent and seemingly
consequent judicial trend is increasing deference to public school
authorities. The societal shift toward a collective, or governmental,
interest was evident in the increasing public perception of a “war” on
drugs and violence in society generally and in schools, particularly after
Goss.127 For example, in its 1986 decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the
Court reasoned:
Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years,
school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent
crime in the schools have become major social problems. . . . Accordingly, we
have recognized that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a
certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures . . . .128

The episodes of school fatalities, punctuated by the shootings at
Columbine High School in 1999,129 served to accelerate the increasing
institutional interest in school safety and security.130

127. Cf. Abigail Thernstrom, Where Did All the Order Go? School Discipline and
the Law, in 1999 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUCATIONAL POLICY 299, 299–301 (Diane
Ravitch ed., 1999) (citing statistical data that suggest rising crime and disorder in the
nation’s schools).
128. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339–40 (1986). Interestingly, the Court
cited the following dictum from Goss in support of its school security rationale: “Events
calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate,
effective action.” Id. at 339 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)). The
T.L.O. Court also cited Ingraham v. Wright, in which the Court recognized “the
seriousness of the disciplinary problems in the Nation’s public schools.” Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 681–82 n.53.
129. See James Brooke, 2 Students in Colorado School Said to Gun Down as Many
as 23 and Kill Themselves in a Siege, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A1.
130. See Cloud, supra note 113, at 17 (“Although public schools are now among the
safest places for students to be, the perception lingers that they are unsafe because of
recent and highly publicized campus tragedies.”). For a direct judicial example within
the Goss progeny, see Williams v. Cambridge Bd. of Educ., 370 F.3d 630, 643 (6th Cir.
2004) (“The tragic destruction at Columbine High School . . . etched devastating images
of adolescent rage run amok onto the national consciousness. The realization that the
perpetrators of this violence were young teenagers crystallized latent fears that a new
danger had emerged from within our own communities.”). For a more recent example in
the T.L.O. progeny, see D.L. v. State, 877 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“in this
post-Columbine world”).
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The overlapping trend of increasing judicial deference toward school
authorities represents a return to the judicial stance of the pre-Goss
era.131 Indeed, prior to Goss, education litigation was limited, with courts
traditionally tending to abstain from interfering with the discretion of school
boards.132 The successive decisions in Tinker and Goss represented a relative
high-water mark for the individual rights of students. However, the
results and the rationales in the post-Goss case law reflect a systematic
swing back to this traditional, deferential stance.133
Previous studies showed the post-Goss shift in results of student
litigation more generally. More specifically, Zirkel found that school
authorities won the Supreme Court student litigation that was based on
secular constitutional grounds rather consistently after the brief TinkerGoss period.134 Subsequently, Lupini and Zirkel, in an empirical analysis of
the outcomes of education litigation arising in the K-12 setting, found a
statistically significant shift in favor of school districts from the mid1970s to the mid-1990s in the student, not employee or other plaintiff,
cases.135 In a follow-up study, Anastasia D’Angelo and Zirkel, using
wider,136 more up-to-date,137 and more representative samples than Lupini,138
and focusing exclusively on student litigation, confirmed a statistically
significant shift in favor of school authorities during the two decades
after Goss.139
The rationales of the Goss progeny provide further evidence of the
shift in favor of school authorities in terms of both school security and
judicial deference. More specifically, although the dicta in the post131. See, e.g., Bernard James & Joanne E. K. Larson, The Doctrine of Deference:
Shifting Constitutional Presumptions and the Supreme Court’s Restatement of Student
Rights after Board of Education v. Earls, 56 S.C. L. REV. 1, 7–10 (2004).
132. See, e.g., Zirkel, supra note 61, at 345.
133. The return of the proverbial pendulum started almost immediately and specifically
for PDP. See supra note 32 and text accompanying note 43 and see infra note 148.
More generally, the trend from judicial activism to judicial self-restraint continues today.
See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Court Under Roberts Limits Judicial Power, WALL ST. J., July 2,
2007, at A1.
134. Zirkel, supra note 119, at 238–39. These grounds, including but not at all
limited to PDP, were distinguishable from Establishment Clause cases, which interposed
the institutional interests of religion, and statutory cases, which provided less latitude for
judicial discretion. Id.
135. Lupini & Zirkel, supra note 93, at 257.
136. Anastasia D. D’Angelo & Perry A. Zirkel, An Outcomes Analysis of StudentInitiated Education Litigation: A Comparison of 1977–1981 and 1997–2001 Decisions,
226 EDUC. L. REP. 539, 540–41 (2008). Their samples were for five-year periods
compared to the three-year periods in Lupini & Zirkel. Id.
137. Their second period ended in 2001, whereas the second period in Lupini &
Zirkel ended in 1996. Id.
138. D’Angelo & Zirkel identified other Westlaw key-number categories that yielded
additional pertinent cases. Id. at 541.
139. Id. at 550.
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Goss case law addressing the societal interest in school security tend to
appear within the parts of the opinion specific to other constitutional
bases, they reflect the courts’ recognition of the increasing interest in
collective safety and security. For example, a federal district court’s
discussion of an Equal Protection claim underscored the school’s
“interest in maintaining a safe school environment, particularly in light
of the apprehensive climate that existed at the time due to highly
publicized incidents of school violence around the country.”140 In a
more general allusion, the Fifth Circuit prefaced a more recent expulsion
case as “highlight[ing] the difficulties of school administrators charged
to balance their duty to provide a safe school with the constitutional
rights of individual students when violence in schools is a serious
concern.”141 Additionally, the discussions specific to PDP more directly
acknowledge judicial deference, ranging from cursory mention142 to
more detailed specific143 or general application.144
This overall trend in favor of school authorities is even more
pronounced in the outcomes for Federal issue rulings, yet it is noticeably
less evident in the results for State Law rulings. The more favorable, but
still largely adverse, outcome pattern for State Law rulings is primarily
attributable to the stronger procedural requirements in some state laws.
More specifically, the procedures prescribed in Goss, which are the basis
for Federal PDP claims, are rudimentary and flexible, therefore permitting a
more interpretative judicial posture. In contrast, the procedures prescribed
in certain states,145 which are the basis for State Law PDP claims, are

140. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep’t, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 206 (D. Mass. 2003).
141. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 611 (5th Cir. 2004).
142. See, e.g., Pirschel v. Sorrell, 2 F. Supp. 2d 930, 934 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (“[W]hile
students clearly are not stripped of their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,
decisions made by school officials in imposing discipline are afforded considerable
deference.”).
143. See, e.g., Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1188,
1196 (D.N.M. 2002) (“Giving due deference to the school administrators in the minute
contours of the disciplinary hearing has always been a hallmark of the federal courts.”),
rev’d on other grounds, 341 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003).
144. See, e.g., D.F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Syosset Cent. Sch. Dist., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119,
131 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“This Court should not be a haven for complaints by students and
their parents against actions taken by school officials in their extremely difficult task of
educating and controlling the irresponsible behavior of their students. As is often the
case, as it is here, these types of conflicts are better handled within the educational
system and not in the federal trial and appellate courts.”).
145. For example, the states that cumulatively accounted for approximately half of
the State Law rulings were, in order, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Minnesota.
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more specific and seemingly stricter, therefore curtailing a judge’s
latitude for deference.146 Thus, it is not surprising that judges ruled
conclusively in favor of the student in only 6% of the Federal PDP
rulings, as opposed to 27% in the State Law PDP rulings.147
In conclusion, contrary to the position of the various commentators
and the mass media,148 Goss is not responsible for a dramatic expansion
of students’ PDP rights.149 Although the Goss dissent was partially
correct to the extent that the lower court progeny has amounted to a
rising tide, although not a flood,150 the results of this study disprove the
dissent’s accompanying prediction of judicial activism.151 The primary
source of any expansion of the Goss decision is not the judiciary, from
the Goss Court to the federal and state courts that have interpreted its
decision, but state codes, either in the form of legislation or regulation.
Thus, although within her overly broad analysis Underwood was wrong
about the courts,152 she was correct that state policy makers are ultimately
responsible for choosing either to add procedural levels to Goss or to
leave undisturbed its constitutional and ultimately judicially constructed
minimal foundation.153

146. However, the increased judicial concern with student safety has in some cases
overwritten requirements of state law. See, e.g., D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 126–27
(interpreting violations of New York state law requirements for advance notice and
cross-examination as, in effect, harmless errors).
147. See supra note 101.
148. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
149. Indeed, in a string of decisions almost immediately thereafter, the Supreme
Court limited the effect of Goss. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978) (requiring
proof of actual injury for more than nominal damages in PDP cases); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (ruling against PDP claim in corporal punishment
context in light of traditional common law remedies); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
322 (1975) (establishing qualified immunity in expulsion case). For a second stage of
limitations, see, for example, Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310
(1986) (“[D]amages based on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights
are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such cases.”); Bd. of Educ. v.
McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 971 (1982) (holding that school board’s interpretation of its
own regulations controls). In a parallel and interrelated movement, the Court has also
narrowed the interpretation of the Due Process Clause in terms of public employees.
See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1991); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
349–50 (1976).
150. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Like Arum, Underwood’s case law
support was in the same direction as our findings. Yet, she identified the courts, in
addition to state and local authorities, as “hav[ing] expanded the minimal due process set
forth in Goss.” Underwood, supra note 1, at 798.
153. Specifically, her ultimate conclusion was as follows: “Certainly the three
minute due process is still within constitutional limits. Since control of the schools rests
in the hands of state legislatures, it would be up to them [to] enact such laws in their
states. I would urge them to do so.” Underwood, supra note 1, at 805–06.
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